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cations law and policy development in both the European Union (EU) and 
United Kingdom. The authors then evaluate the implementation experience 
of OFCOM from both legal and policy perspectives, and analyse the Offi ce of 
Communications Act 2002, the Communications Act 2003 and the Regula-
tory Framework for Electronic Communications Services 2002 adopted by the 
EU, as well as the regulatory and personnel policies of OFCOM. Finally, the 
authors argue that Hong Kong can learn eight lessons from the UK in its future 
implementation of a unifi ed communications regulator. These include strong 
political support, systematic planning, the appointment of credible and compe-
tent staff, adequate supporting legislation, a “light-hand” regulatory approach, 
openness and transparency, the guarantee and promotion of media and cul-
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together with legal remedies for members of the public aggrieved by the policies 
or decisions of the regulator.
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Introduction
Since the 1990s, many countries and jurisdictions have adopted a unifi ed 
communications regulator to cope with the phenomenon of technologi-
cal convergence, which breaks down the traditional barriers between the 
telecommunications and broadcasting sectors. For example, Malaysia 
established the Malaysian Communications and Multi-Media Commis-
sion (MCMC) in 1999, while the United Kingdom adopted the Offi ce 
of Communications (OFCOM) in 2003. The Hong Kong government 
followed this international trend and issued a Consultation Paper in 
April 2006 to propose the establishment of a unifi ed communications 
regulator called the Communications Authority (CA).1 It was obvious 
from the Consultation Paper that the Hong Kong government consid-
ered OFCOM as one possible model of unifi ed regulator that Hong Kong 
can follow in establishing the CA in future.   
This article attempts to study the legal and policy implications of 
implementing OFCOM in the UK and evaluates what lessons Hong 
Kong can learn in its future adoption of the CA. OFCOM is highly rel-
evant to Hong Kong for two reasons: to begin with, it is one of the best 
models of a unifi ed communications regulator available in the world, 
which serves as a good reference for Hong Kong. Moreover, the exist-
ing “sector-specifi c” regulatory framework for Hong Kong communica-
tions sectors, namely, the Telecommunications Authority regulating the 
telecommunications sector and the Broadcasting Authority which super-
vises the broadcasting sector, was inherited from the UK when Hong 
Kong was a British colony. The current regulatory regime in Hong Kong 
is therefore similar to its British counterpart prior to the establishment of 
OFCOM. As a result, the experience of OFCOM is signifi cant to Hong 
Kong in planning its future transition from the current “sector-specifi c” 
regime to a unifi ed regulatory regime.
This article is divided into four parts. Part One analyses the govern-
ment proposals on the establishment of a unifi ed regulator called the 
Communications Authority. Part Two gives an overview of the tele-
communications law and policy development in both the EU and the 
UK, which helps us to understand the background for the establishment 
of OFCOM. Part Three considers the implementation experience of 
OFCOM from both legal and policy perspectives. Part Four evaluates 
what lessons Hong Kong can learn from the implementation experience 
of OFCOM in its future establishment of a unifi ed CA.
1 The Consultation Paper is available at http://www.citb.gov.hk/ctb/eng/paper/pdf/CA_consultation_
paper.pdf.
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Part One: The Hong Kong Government Proposals on the 
Establishment of the Communications Authority
In the Consultation Paper on the Establishment of the CA released in 
March 2006, the government explained why Hong Kong needs a uni-
fi ed regulator. To begin with, it was necessary because of technologi-
cal and market developments in the communications sectors.2 Second, 
the need for fair competition in a converging market also called for a 
unifi ed regulator. At present, competition in the local communications 
sector is regulated by “sector-specifi c” laws and such a framework will 
become increasingly ineffective as the broadcasting and telecommuni-
cations markets intertwine with each other. For example, anti-compet-
itive practices may arise, the impact of which can only be assessed if 
the entire communications sector is treated as a single market. Equally, 
new opportunities for business synergies will arise in the era of conver-
gence, so that, in order to avoid inhibiting progress, the regulator must 
understand the new converging markets; a unifi ed regulator can also bet-
ter cope with “cross-sectoral” competition in this new environment.3 
Third, a unifi ed regulator will benefi t both regulator and operator. It 
can provide “one-stop-shopping” and better consistency in regulatory 
approach and practice to the industry players, thereby reducing their 
administrative burden and enhancing their effi ciency. The regulator can 
also pool together expertise to deal with issues arising from a converging 
environment.4 Fourth, because regulation of the broadcasting and tele-
communications sectors calls for similar expertise, operational synergy 
and effi ciency can be accomplished by merging the broadcasting and 
telecommunications regulators into one unifi ed regulator.5 Fifth, this can 
promote effi cient utilisation of public resources, bring about innovations 
and increase competition in the communications sectors. All these ben-
efi t consumers in Hong Kong.6
In the Consultation Paper, the Hong Kong government also discussed 
different approaches for the establishment of the CA. The document 
conceded that the “ideal” approach would be, fi rst, to adopt a compre-
hensive communications legislation for regulation of the entire commu-
nications sector thereby empowering the proposed CA to enforce such 
a statute. However, this approach will require a major review of existing 
2 Ibid., paras 16–19.
3 Ibid., paras 20–23.
4 Ibid., para 24.
5 Ibid., paras 25–26. 
6 Ibid., para 27.
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communications laws before they can be consolidated into a single piece 
of legislation, which is inconsistent with the government’s plan to estab-
lish a unifi ed CA expeditiously.7
As a result, the government proposed a “staged approach”. In the fi rst 
stage, the government will adopt a new piece of legislation called the 
Communications Authority Ordinance to merge the existing telecom-
munications and broadcasting regulators into a CA. The new unifi ed 
regulator will be empowered to enforce the existing telecommunica-
tions and broadcasting regulations. In the second stage, the new CA will 
review the existing “sector-specifi c” laws and consolidate them into a 
unifi ed Communications Ordinance. Such a staged approach, the gov-
ernment has argued, will enable a speedy establishment of the unifi ed 
regulator.8
The Consultation Paper also defi nes the public mission of the new 
CA: promotion of consumer interests, fair competition, innovation 
and investment in the communications industry. The ultimate objec-
tive is to “maintain a vibrant communications sector to enhance Hong 
Kong’s competitive advantage as a communications hub in the region”.9 
Another key mission of the Authority will be to uphold the freedom of 
speech. The core values of CA are also defi ned as: “open and transparent, 
fair and consistent, engaging and supportive”.10
The Consultation Paper also outlines the regulatory approach of the 
new regulator. It should be relaxed, with emphasis on fair competition, 
rather than on active regulation by detailed rules. Second, it should 
avoid stifl ing innovation and investment by regulatory intervention, 
and extending its regulatory ambit continuously. Third, it should adopt 
regulatory tolerance, rather than regulatory intervention, as its guiding 
principle.11
What is more, the Consultation Paper lays down the structure of the 
unifi ed regulator. It proposes a governing body that makes major deci-
sions, promulgates plans, approves procedures on the basis of transpar-
ency and accountability, oversees staff performance and ensures that 
the Authority serves its public purposes. A board of seven members is 
also proposed to ensure a plurality of views, as well as high effi ciency 
in decision-making and approval processes.12 It also proposed that the 
executive support for the future CA, which is called the Offi ce of the 
7 Ibid., paras 28–29.
8 Ibid., paras 30–32.
9 Ibid., para 37.
10 Ibid., para 39.
11 Ibid., paras 40–43.
12 Ibid., paras 44–48.
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Communications Authority (OFCA), will be staffed by civil servants 
and headed by a public offi cer.13
Finally, the Paper also sets out the timetable for the implementation 
of the CA. The legislation for its establishment should be introduced 
by around November 2006. The members of the Authority would then 
be appointed within one month of the passage of the law, while the CA 
should commence operations within four months from the passage of 
the law.14 It is noteworthy, however, that the relevant legislation for the 
establishment of the CA has hitherto not been passed after a lapse of 
over four years since the publication of the Consultation Paper.
In the Consultation Paper, the government referred to the interna-
tional trend of adoption of unifi ed communications regulators in many 
developed countries, of which the UK was one. At the end of 2002, the 
UK government merged the existing fi ve regulators into OFCOM.15 In 
the second part of this article, we analyse, therefore, these UK legal and 
policy reforms. Also, because of the binding nature of EU telecommuni-
cations law and policy on the UK, we will consider their relevance to the 
establishment of OFCOM.
Part Two: Overview of Legal and Policy Reforms in the UK and 
EU Telecommunications Sectors: Background for the 
Establishment of OFCOM 
In retrospect, the establishment of OFCOM was infl uenced by changes in 
telecommunications law and policy in both the EU and the UK.16 At the 
EU level, it was in the late 1980s that legal and policy reforms in the tele-
communications sector took place. In 1987, the European Commission 
(EC) issued a Green Paper on “the Development of a Common Market 
for Telecommunications Services and Equipment”,17 which advocated 
the opening of European telecommunications markets to create a single 
market by 1992,18 by way of “liberalisation” and “harmonisation”. Such 
13 Ibid., paras 49–57.
14 Ibid., paras 60–62.
15 Ibid., paras 13–14.
16 For a discussion of the EU law in the telecommunications sector, see Braun J.-D. and Capito R. 
“The Emergence of EC Telecommunications Law as a Self-Standing Field within Community 
Law”, in Koenig C., Bartosch, A., Braun J.-D. and Marion R., EC Competition Law and Telecom-
munications Law (Wolters & Kluwer, 2009), pp 41–52.
17 COM (87) 290 fi nal, 30 June 1987. Actually, the Commission’s Action Plan in relation to the 
Telecommunications Sector, COM (84) 277 preceded this.
18 See Sherer J. and Bartsch T., “Telecommunications Law and Policy of the European Union”, in 
Scherer J. (ed), Telecommunications Laws in Europe (5th edn, Haywards Heath, 2005).
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an approach was described by Koenig and Roder as the “basic dualism” of 
EC telecommunications law.19
In the late 1990s, the EU found it necessary to review its tele-
communications law and policy due to the rapid development of the 
convergence phenomenon, which was breaking down the traditional 
barriers between the telecommunications, broadcasting and internet 
sectors. On 3 December 1997, the EC promulgated a Green Paper on 
“Convergence of the Telecommunications, Media and Information 
Technology Sectors, and the Implications for Regulation owards an 
Information Society Approach” (1997 Green Paper).20 This was fol-
lowed, on 10 November 1999, by the publication of a Communica-
tion titled “Towards a New Framework for Electronic Communications 
Infrastructure and Associate Services” (The 1999 Communications 
Review). This consultation document marked the beginning of a new 
era for the EU in which a new regulatory framework for all communica-
tion services was developed.21
On 26 April 2000, the EC announced the results of its public con-
sultation on the 1999 Communications Review, which eventually led 
to an overhaul of the entire regulatory regime for the European com-
munications sector. By 12 December 2001, the European Parliament had 
adopted the new European communication regulatory package,22 which 
has been commonly known as the Regulatory Framework for Electronic 
Communications Services (the EU Regulatory Framework).23
The EU Framework consisted of six directives, fi rst, a Directive 
2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic com-
munications networks and services (OJ L 108/33, 24 April 2002) (the 
Framework Directive); second, a Directive 2002/20/EC on the authorisa-
tion of electronic communications networks and services (OJ L108/21, 
24 April 2002) (the Authorization Directive); third, a Directive 2002/19/
EC on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications 
19 Koenig C. and Roder E. “The Regulation of Telecommunications in the European Union: A 
Challenge for the Countries Acceding to the European Community” [1999] European Business 
Law Review 333 (334).  
20 COM (97) 623.
21 For more discussion of the Communication “Towards a New Framework for Electronic Com-
munications Infrastructure and Associate Services” (“The 1999 Communications Review”), 
COM (1999) 539; see Brodey M. “Telecommunications: Towards a New Regulatory Frame-
work for Electronic Communications”, Computer and Telecommunications Law Review, 2000, 
Vol 6(7), pp 180–186.
22 See Commission Press Release IP/01/1801 dated 12 Dec 2001 http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/
cgi/guesten.ksh?p_action.gettxt+gt&doc=IP/01/18010RAPID&lg=EN&display=. 
23 For a discussion of the EU Regulatory Framework, see Walden I. “European Union Communi-
cations Law”, Chapter Five, Telecommunications Law and Regulation (3rd edn, Oxford University 
Press, 2009), Ch 5, pp 167–210.
Vol 40 Part 1 A Unifi ed Communications Regulator 117
networks and associate facilities (OJ L108/7, 24 April 2002) (the Access 
Directive); fourth, a Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ 
rights relating to electronic communications networks and services (OJ 
L 108/7, 24 April 2002) (the Universal Services Directive); fi fth, a Direc-
tive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the pro-
tection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (OJ L201/37, 
24 April 2002)(the Data Protection Directive); and sixth, a Regula-
tion 2887/2000/EC on unbundled access to the local loop (OJ L336/4, 
18 December 2000) (the Local Loop Regulation). The Local Loop Regu-
lation had actually been adopted prior to the other fi ve directives but took 
effect in 2002. As Sinclair indicated, the EC had considered its imple-
mentation a matter of priority.24
Of the above six directives, the most important one was the Frame-
work Directive,25 which developed a “harmonised” regulatory framework 
for the EU electronic communications services. This was in fact the 
“core” legal document for the EU Regulatory Framework. In contrast, 
the Authorisation Directive attempted to remedy the problems result-
ing from the diverse licensing regimes adopted by different EU mem-
ber states by creating a “general authorisation regime” to remove the 
entry barriers existing between them.26 Likewise, the Access Directive 
tried to build up a “harmonised” regulatory framework for suppliers of 
electronic communications services which would promote competition, 
service interoperability and consumer rights.27 Similarly, the Directive 
on Universal Service dealt with promoting and monitoring the service 
obligations28 and, fi nally, the Data Protection Directive attempted to 
“harmonise” data protection across the EU member states.29
As one of its member states, the UK’s telecommunications law and 
policy is inevitably shaped by the aforesaid developments in the EU. 
24 Sinclair M. “A New European Communications Services Regulatory Package: An Overview”, 
Computer and Telecommunications Law Review, 2001, Vol 7(6), pp 156–165, at 157.
25 For a detailed discussion of the Framework Directive, see Braun J.-D. and Capito R., “The 
Framework Directive”, in Koenig C., Bartosch A., Braun J.-D. and Marion R., EC Competition 
Law and Telecommunications Law (Wolters & Kluwer, 2009), pp 343–380.
26 For a detailed discussion of the Authorisation Directive, see Brandenberg, A. “Authorization”, 
in Koenig C., Bartosch A., Braun J.-D. and Marion R., EC Competition Law and Telecommunica-
tions Law (Wolters & Kluwer, 2009), Ch 10, pp 471–508. 
27 For a detailed discussion of the Access Directive, see Winkler K.E. and Baumgarten, “The 
Framework for Network Access and Interconnection”, in Koenig C., Bartosch A., Braun J.-D. 
and Marion R., EC Competition Law and Telecommunications Law (Wolters & Kluwer, 2009) 
Ch 9, pp 421–470.
28 For a detailed discussion of the Universal Service Directive, see Nikolinakos N.Th., EU Compe-
tition Law and Regulation in the Converging Telecommunications, Media and IT Sectors, “Universal 
Service Provisions – End User Rights” (Kluwer Law International, 2006), Ch 9, pp 295–332.  
29 For a detailed discussion of the Data Protection Directive Schnabel C., “Privacy and Data Pro-
tection in EC Telecommunications Law”, Koenig C., Bartosch, A., Braun J.-D. and Marion R., 
EC Competition Law and Telecommunications Law (Wolters & Kluwer, 2009) Ch 11, pp 520–522.
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In 1981, adoption of the Telecommunications Act of 1981 marked the 
beginning of reforms of the British telecommunications sector by cre-
ating British Telecommunications (BT), which took over the telecom-
munications function of the Post Offi ce. Under the 1981 Act, a second 
licence of fi xed telecommunications network was also issued to Mercury 
Communications Limited (Mercury). However, the 1981 Act did not 
envisage full competition in the telecommunications sector. On the con-
trary, the Conservative government clearly stated its policy in a 1983 
Duopoly Statement that it had no intention to issue licences to operators 
other than BT and Mercury.
Three years later, the UK government passed the Telecommunica-
tions Act 1984, which brought about the privatisation of BT. The Act 
established the Director General of Telecommunications (DGT) as the 
independent telecommunications regulator, which was supported by the 
Offi ce of Telecommunications (OFTEL). The Act also set out the legal 
framework for a competitive telecommunications market. However, 
while the law could potentially lead to the opening of the telecommu-
nications sector through the issue of more licences, the British govern-
ment maintained the “duopoly” policy throughout the 1980s by granting 
licences only to BT and Mercury. 
The Telecommunications Act 1984, therefore, created a regime 
which regulated the telecommunications operators by way of licensing.30 
However, the procedure to amend the licences issued was very compli-
cated. As Brisby pointed out, the infl exible procedure did not cater for 
market changes.31
Eventually, in the early 1990s, the UK government undertook the 
duopoly review, which resulted in the release of a white paper titled 
“Competition and Choice: Telecommunications Policy for the 1990s” in 
March 1991.32 This signifi cantly ended the duopoly of BT and Mercury 
and marked the beginning of a more open and competitive telecommu-
nications policy in the UK. Liberalisation and competition in the British 
telecommunications sector continued throughout the 1990s, which was 
intensifi ed by the emergence of the convergence phenomenon that we 
discuss in more detail below.     
At this juncture, it is interesting to note the parallel legal and policy 
reforms taking place in the UK and the EU during the late 1990s and 
30 For example, s 5(1) of Telecommunications Act 1984 stipulated that “a person who runs the 
telecommunications system with the United Kingdom shall be guilty of an offence unless he is 
authorized to run the system by licence … ”
31 Brisby P. “The Regulation of Telecommunications Networks and Services in the United 
Kingdom”, Computer and Telecommunications Review, 2006, Vol 12(4), pp 114–139. 
32 CM 1303.
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early 2000s. When the EU promulgated the 1997 Green Paper, the UK 
government also published its own Green Paper on “Regulating Com-
munications: Approaching Convergence in the Information Age”.33 
After extensive public consultations, the UK government then pub-
lished a paper called “Regulating Communications: The Way Ahead” 
on 12 December 2000, which set out for the fi rst time the intention 
of the UK government to establish a unifi ed communications regulator 
called OFCOM.34 Finally, when the EU implemented the 2002 Regula-
tory Framework, the UK similarly adopted the Offi ce of Communica-
tions Act 2002, which paved the way for the adoption of OFCOM. It is 
therefore clear that OFCOM was adopted in UK government both as a 
response to the 2002 Regulatory Framework as well as the convergence 
phenomenon.
It is also noteworthy that similar regulatory reforms took place in 
other EU member states like Austria and Italy, which actually reformed 
their regulatory structures before the UK. For example, Austria imple-
mented the Austrian Telecommunications Act 1997 to establish the 
Austrian Regulatory Authority for Broadcasting and Telecommu-
nications which was a convergent regulatory authority.35 Likewise, 
Italy established the Autorita per le garanzie nelle comunicazioni 
(AGCOM) in 1997, which was created to regulate both the telecom-
munications and audiovisual sectors. According to Verdier-Bonchut, 
the UK actually imitated the Italian experience of AGCOM in estab-
lishing OFCOM.36
In contrast, Smith37 explained that the adoption of OFCOM was 
driven by the interests of commercial media operators in UK as they 
attempted to use convergence to justify further deregulation of the com-
munication sectors. The OFCOM also refl ected the commitment of the 
New Labour government to free market principles and policy innova-
tion. The regulatory bickering between the Independent Television 
33 CM 4022.
34 CM 5010. For a discussion of the White Paper, see Calleja R. and Crane T., “White Paper, 
White Wash ? A New – But Uncertain – Future for Communications”, Entertainment Law 
Review, 2001, Vol 12(4), pp 123–129.  
35 For an analysis of the development of communications regulation in Austria, see Michael Latzer 
M., Just N., Saurwein F. and Slominski P., (2006), “Institutional variety in communications 
regulation. Classifi cation scheme and empirical evidence from Austria”, Telecommunications 
Policy 30(3–4) April–May 2006, pp 152–170.
36 For an analysis of the establishment and implementation problems of AGCOM in Italy, see 
Verdier-Bobchut V., “Regulation of the Audiovisual and Telecommunications Sector in Italy: 
From Community Challenge to National Issue”, International Review of Administrative Sciences, 
69(2003), pp 271–283.   
37 Smith P., “The politics of UK television policy: the making of Ofcom”, Media, Culture, & 
Society, 2006, Vol 28(6): pp 929–940.
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Commission and OFTEL, as well as the struggle between rival depart-
ments within the New Labour government also hastened the adoption 
of OFCOM. As a result, different stakeholders for various reasons, sup-
ported a unifi ed regulatory regime for the communications sector. 
The OFCOM, the “super-regulator”, was eventually formed by “merg-
ing” fi ve regulators by virtue of the Communications Act 2003. With 
powers and duties defi ned by the Act, OFCOM was established to regu-
late both content and carriage, products and services, commercial and 
public service broadcasting. In this way, it has developed a common 
regulatory approach to the telecommunication and broadcasting sectors, 
with a view to pushing for both convergence and diversifi cation.38
Part Three: Implementation Experience of OFCOM: 
Legal and Policy Perspectives
After the publication of the White Paper, it took less than three years for 
the UK government to establish OFCOM. The milestones in its estab-
lishment can be summarised by Table 1 below:
Table 1: Milestones in creating OFCOM39
Date Milestone
2000 Dec White Paper “A New Future for Communications” was published
2001 Sep Presentation of OFCOM Scoping Report to ministers
2002 Mar Royal Assent to the OFCOM Act
 May Publication of the draft Communications Bill 
 July Appointment of David Currie as fi rst Chairman of OFCOM 
 Sep Appointment of non-executives to the Main Board
 Nov Submission of Report “Creation of OFCOM” by the Manage-
ment Consortium
2003 Jan Appointment of Stephen Carter as the fi rst Chief Executive of 
OFCOM
 Jan Riverside House confi rmed to be the site in London for OFCOM 
Headquarters
 July Royal Assent to the Communications Act
38 Livingstone S., Lunt P. and Miller L., “Citizens and consumers: discursive debates during and 
after the Communications Act 2003”, Media, Culture, & Society, 2007, Vol 29(4): pp 613–638.
39 This table was adapted from National Audit Offi ce, “The creation of Ofcom: Wider lessons for 
public sector mergers of regulatory agencies”, LONDON: The Stationery Offi ce, 3 July 2006, 
available at http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/0506/the_creation_of_ofcom_wider_l.aspx. 
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The implementation experience of OFCOM can be analysed from 
both legal and policy dimensions. For the legal dimension, it was shaped 
by two important pieces of UK legislation, namely, the Offi ce of Com-
munications Act 2002 and the Communications Act 2003, and the EU 
Regulatory Framework.
Offi ce of Communications Act 2002  
On 19 March 2002, the Act was adopted, which provide the legal 
basis for the UK government to establish OFCOM before the Commu-
nications Act came into existence one year later. As a consequence, 
OFCOM started to prepare for the takeover of regulatory functions from 
the then existing regulators, namely, the Director General of Telecom-
munications, the Independent Television Commission, the Broadcast-
ing Standard Commission, and the Radio Authority. Under the Offi ce 
of Communications Act, a Board was established to become responsible 
for the appointment of a Chief Executive as well as the necessary staff 
when OFCOM came into full operation. However, the 2002 Act also 
prohibited the Board from any interference with the works of then exist-
ing regulators.40 As explained by Romer and Maguire, such provision 
prevented “regulatory uncertainty” and permitted the existing regulators 
to carry on their works until the implementation of the Communica-
tions Act 2003.41 Moreover, the Act required the existing regulators to 
assist by carrying out their functions in a matter that promoted the inter-
est of OFCOM.42
Communications Act 2003 and EU Regulatory Framework   
The Communications Act was passed on 17 July 2003,43 while the four 
Directives contained in the EU Regulatory Framework commenced on 
25 July 2003. It therefore refl ected the close relationship between the 
two. By virtue of the Communications Act 2003, OFCOM formally 
took over the functions of the abovementioned fi ve “sector-specifi c” 
communications regulators, including the Independent Television 
Commission, Radio Authority, the Offi ce of Telecommunications, the 
Broadcasting Standards Commission and the Radio communications 
Agency on 29 December 2003. Such regulatory development could be 
interpreted as “a fairly straightforward response by UK policymakers 
to the convergence of television, telecommunications and computing 
40 s 2, Communications Act 2002. 
41 Romer J. and Maguire G., “An Overview of the Draft United Kingdom Communications Bill”, 
Computer and Telecommunications Law Review, 2002, Vol 8(6), pp 136–140, at 139.  
42 s 4, Offi ce of Communications Act 2002. 
43 Ch 21, Laws of UK 2003.
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technologies facilitated by digitalisation”.44 It could also be taken as a 
signifi cant shift in the UK approach of communications regulation from 
one of allocating a relatively scarce spectrum to one of market power 
control for facilitating competition.45
The 2003 Communications Act was thus a substantial piece of leg-
islation with 411 sections and 19 schedules. It not only implemented 
the communications policy of the New Labour government set out in 
the 1999 White Paper but also the four Directives contained in the 
EU Regulatory Framework, namely, the Framework Directive, the 
Authorisation Directive, the Access Directive and the Universal Ser-
vices Directive. 
As a result, the Act incorporated many EU law principles which 
resulted in its unique legislative pattern. For example, the principal 
duties of OFCOM are set out in s 3 of the Communications Act 2003 
as: fi rst, “to further interests of citizens in relation to communications 
matters”; and second, “to further consumer interests in relevant markets, 
where appropriate by promoting competition”.46 Such provision demon-
strated the need of OFCOM to recognise both social and economic goals 
in formulating its regulatory policies.
However, those duties are “overridden” by s 3 of the Act, which 
required OFCOM to act in accordance with the six EC requirements.47 
These included requirements to: fi rst, promote competition; second, to 
contribute to the development of the EU internal market; third, to pro-
mote the interests of EU citizens; fourth, to carry out their functions in 
a manner which does not favour any form of network or service; fi fth, to 
encourage the provision of network access; and sixth, to encourage com-
pliance with international standards to enhance service interoperability 
and consumer choice. As Brisby argued, the regime of duties and prin-
ciples of OFCOM created by the Communications Act 2003 was com-
plicated and “messy”, which made it diffi cult for the regulator to consider 
all of them in an effective manner.48
Signifi cantly, new developments took place in both the EU and 
the UK after the adoption of the Regulatory Framework and the 
Communications Act 2003. On 13 November 2007, the European 
44 Smith P. (2006), “The politics of UK television policy: the making of Ofcom”, Media, Culture, 
& Society, Vol 28(6): pp 929–940, at 929.
45 Collins R. (1997), “Back to the Future: Digital Television and Convergence in the United 
Kingdom”, Telecommunications Policy, Vol 22(4/5): pp 383–96, at 395.
46 s 3(1).
47 s 4.
48 Brisby P., “The Regulation of Telecommunications Networks and Services in the United 
Kingdom”, Computer and Telecommunications Law Review, 2006, Vol 12(4), pp 114–139 at 135. 
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Commission published a set of legislative proposals for further reform 
of the electronic communications sector.49 These proposals attempt to 
build on the Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications 
by promoting regulatory harmonisation, enhancing independence of 
national regulators and strengthening consumer protection.50
In the UK, meanwhile, the confl icts and tensions of OFCOM in fur-
thering the consumer and citizen interests as articulated in the afore-
said s 3 of the Communications Act has remained a topical issue among 
academics and policymakers after its adoption in 2003. For example, 
Livingstone, Lunt and Miller advocated a new defi nition of citizen inter-
est that is distinct from consumer interest.51 Likewise, OFCOM issued a 
Discussion Paper titled “Citizens, Communications and Convergence”52 
to further public deliberations on the issue.
We now turn to look at OFCOM experience from a policy perspec-
tive, which can be divided into two issues: regulatory policy and person-
nel policy.   
Regulatory Policy
The Board of OFCOM is responsible for formulating regulatory pol-
icies.53 In practice, it follows certain guiding principles. It operates 
“with a bias against intervention”, and only intervenes if there is a 
legal duty to accomplish a public goal that cannot be achieved by the 
markets. The OFCOM also undertakes to employ the “least intrusive” 
regulatory tools and ensure their actions are “evidence-based, propor-
tionate, consistent, accountable and transparent”. They also carry out 
consultations with operators and assess the regulatory impact before 
49 Proposal of the Commission of 13 November 2007 for a Directive amending Directives 2002/21/
EC (framework), 2002/19/EC (access and interconnection), and 2002/20/EC (authorisation), 
COM(2007) 697; Proposal of the Commission of 13 November 2007 for a Directive amending 
Directive 2002/22/EC (universal service and users’ rights), Directive 2002/58/EC (protection of 
privacy in the electronic communications sector) and Regulation 2006/2004 on consumer protec-
tion cooperation, COM(2007) 698; Proposal of the Commission of 13 November 2007 for a Reg-
ulation establishing the European Electronic Communications Market Authority, COM(2007) 
699, available at http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/tomorrow/index_en.htm. 
50 For an analysis of the 2007 legislative proposals, see de Streel, A., “Current and future Euro-
pean Regulation of Current and Future European Regulation of Electronic Communications: 
A Critical Assessment”, Telecommunications Policy, Vol 32 (2008) 11, pp 722–734. 
51 See Livingstone S., Lunt P. and Miller L., “Citizens, Consumers and the Citizen-Consumer: 
Articulating the Citizen Interest in Media and Communications Regulation”, Discourse and 
Communication, 2007, Vol 1(1), pp 85–111.
52 For an analysis of the Discussion Paper, see Livingstone S., “What is the citizen’s interest in 
communication regulation? Ofcom’s agenda for ‘Citizens, Communications and Conver-
gence’”, unpublished paper presented at Media@lse Fifth Anniversary Conference, 21–23 
Sep 2008, LSW London. Available at http:eprints.lse.ac.uk/21561.
53 Doyle G. and Vick D.W., “The Communications Act 2003: A New Regulatory Framework in 
the UK”, Convergence, 2005, Vol 11, p 75.  
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intervening in the market.54 This was different from traditional UK 
regulators, which were usually staffed by civil servants. However, it is 
noteworthy that OFCOM has recently been criticised by a consumer 
group for its slow intervention and reluctance to act without external 
pressure.55       
Personnel Policy
In fact, the personnel policy of OFCOM was very innovative by UK 
standards. For example, the fi rst chairman of OFCOM Board, David 
Currie, or Lord Currie of Marylebone, was not a civil servant but was 
“a highly respected academic and economist with substantial regulatory 
experience”. Moreover, many of OFCOM staffs were recruited from the 
private sector, including “a signifi cant number of genuine high-fl yers”.56
Part Four: Lessons from UK for Hong Kong in the Future Adoption 
of Communications Authority
Based on the above analysis of the implementation experience of 
OFCOM, and taking into account the Hong Kong government propos-
als at the beginning of this article, we consider that Hong Kong has the 
following eight lessons to learn from UK with regard to future establish-
ment of the Communications Authority.
Lesson 1: Implementation of a Unifi ed Regulator Needs Strong 
Political Support
The success of a regulator depends heavily on the political support of the 
ruling government. In the UK, although the idea of a unifi ed communi-
cations regulator was supported by different stakeholders, one important 
factor contributing to its success was that OFCOM was part of the New 
Labour government’s commitment to free market principles and policy 
innovation. As far as the Hong Kong government is concerned, there-
fore, it is vital that they give strong political support to the future success 
of the CA. However, judging from the delay in the implementation of 
the Authority, it is uncertain at this stage whether that support will be 
forthcoming, unlike its UK counterpart. 
54 OFCOM Annual Report 2008–09, p 33. 
55 Brooker S. and Taylor A., Rating Regulators-Ofcom, Consumer Focus, paras 2–12 , 2009 avail-
able at http://www.consumerfocus.org.uk/assets/1/fi les/2009/06/10708_CF_Ofcom_web.pdf.   
56 Brisby P., “The Regulation of Telecommunications Networks and Services in the United 
Kingdom”, Computer and Telecommunications Law Review, 2006, Vol 12(4), pp 114–139. 
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Lesson 2: Implementation of a Unifi ed Regulator Needs Systematic Planning
We have already seen that the passage of the UK Offi ce of Commu-
nications Act 2002 enabled the establishment of OFCOM and the 
recruitment of the necessary staff before its formal takeover of the 
regulatory functions of the fi ve regulators at the end of 2003. This 
provided a new set of duties and principles to follow in regulating the 
converging communications sector and demonstrated that systematic 
planning is vital to successful implementation. 
From the HK government proposal stated at the beginning of this 
article, however, the government will depart from the UK practice in 
that the CA will continue to rely on existing “sector-specifi c” telecom-
munications and broadcasting regulations. Only after its establishment, 
the Authority will undertake a review of the existing regulations and 
consolidate them into a unifi ed Communications Ordinance. It means 
therefore that the unifi ed communications regulator in Hong Kong will 
not have the benefi t and guidance of a unifi ed piece of legislation with 
which to regulate the converging communications sector. Whether such 
planning is effective in future implementation remains to be seen.           
Lesson 3: Appointment of Credible and Competent Persons is Crucial to the 
Success of a Unifi ed Regulator
Those in charge of a unifi ed communications regulator will directly 
affect the market environment and it is imperative to have staff familiar 
with the communication industries. The implementation experience of 
OFCOM demonstrated this point well as many of its staff came from the 
communications sector and as indicated earlier, some were “high-fl yers”. 
However, as stated at the beginning of this article, the Hong Kong gov-
ernment proposes that the executive support for the Communications 
Authority (called the OFCA in the proposal) will be staffed by civil ser-
vants and headed by a public offi cer. Again, whether such support struc-
ture and leadership will be conducive to the future implementation of 
the CA in Hong Kong is questionable.
Lesson 4: Adequate Legislation and Regulation is Necessary for the Adoption 
of a Unifi ed Regulator
It is necessary to have the proper legislation in place before the adoption 
of a unifi ed communications regulator. The UK Offi ce of Communica-
tions Act of 2002 was adopted to pave the way for the establishment of 
OFCOM. Then the Communications Act came into operation in 2003, 
which not only vested all powers of the fi ve regulators into OFCOM but 
also set out detailed duties and principles for the regulator to follow. This 
126 Richard Wu Wai Sang & Grace Leung Lai Kuen (2010) HKLJ
has demonstrated the importance of developing a suffi cient legal and 
regulatory framework. 
As we have already seen from the government proposal, the existing 
“sector-specifi c” telecommunications and broadcasting regulations will 
remain and a unifi ed Communications Ordinance akin to the Commu-
nications Act 2003 will not come into existence until the CA completes 
a review of the existing communications regulations. One can only hope 
that an adequate legal and regulatory framework will be put into place 
for the future implementation of a unifi ed communications regulator in 
Hong Kong.
Lesson 5: A Unifi ed Regulator should Adopt a Light-hand Approach 
in Regulating the Communications Sectors
The OFCOM has consistently adopted a “light-hand” approach in its 
regulation, which avoids unnecessary interference to the communica-
tions market and has contributed to its successful implementation in 
the UK. Similarly, the Hong Kong CA will adopt regulatory tolerance 
as its guiding principle. Moreover, it will avoid stifl ing innovation and 
investment by regulatory intervention, and refrain from extending its 
regulatory ambit continuously. These principles are consistent with the 
“light-hand” approach adopted by OFCOM and should contribute to the 
implementation of the unifi ed communications regulator. 
Lesson 6: The Unifi ed Regulator should be Open and Transparent to 
Remove Any Public Concern Over its Legitimacy Defi cit
When OFCOM was fi rst proposed in the UK, its legitimacy was ques-
tioned for fears of its “undemocratic” nature and its potential develop-
ment into a “super regulator” overseeing the entire communications 
sector with little public accountability.57 Yet in the past few years, the 
implementation experience removed such concerns of “legitimacy 
defi cit” as OFCOM demonstrated a high degree of openness and trans-
parency. In fact, as a regulator, it undertook wide consultations before 
implementing regulatory actions, and gave reasons for the policies it 
implemented as well as the individual cases it adjudicated.58 In Hong 
Kong, the government stated that the core values of the CA were also 
to be defi ned as open and transparent. The future CA must, therefore, 
57 See, for example, Crane T., “OFCOM – a new order for communications regulation or a bureau-
cratic nightmare?”, Computer and Telecommunications Law Review, 2003, Vol 9(2), pp 37–40.
58 Feintuck M. and Varney M., Media Regulation, Public Interest and the Law, 2006, pp 170–176.
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attain a similar degree of transparency as OFCOM in the UK in order to 
alleviate any public fears over its legitimacy defi cit.
Lesson 7: The Unifi ed Regulator should Guarantee and Promote Media and 
Cultural Diversity
In the UK, OFCOM was required by the 2003 Communications Act to 
establish a Content Board to regulate media content,59 the members of 
which would come from different parts of the country.60 The law there-
fore demonstrated the policymakers’ desire to broaden the geographical 
representation of the board, thereby ensuring a diversity and plurality of 
views in the regulation of media content. However, Feintuck and Varney 
pointed out the failure to ensure a balance of cultural or ethnic back-
grounds in the appointment of board members which still contributed to 
statutory defi ciency.61 In the case of the Hong Kong government propos-
als, there appears to be no similar establishment like the Content Board 
in OFCOM. However it is essential for the future CA to put mechanisms 
in place to guarantee and promote cultural and media diversity so as to 
ensure the policy objective of maintaining a vibrant communications 
sector to enhance Hong Kong’s competitive advantage as a communica-
tions hub in the region.
Lesson 8: The Functions, Duties and Powers of the Unifi ed Regulator 
should be Subject to Adequate Legal Control and Legal Remedies should 
be Available to the Aggrieved Members of the Public
In UK, the functions, duties and powers of OFCOM are set out in, and regu-
lated by, the Communications Act 2003. Moreover, the regulatory actions 
of OFCOM are subject to the Human Rights Act 1998. What is more, 
common law remedies like judicial reviews are available to members of the 
pubic who feel aggrieved by the policies and decisions of OFCOM. This 
has ensured that OFCOM is legally accountable for any policy adopted or 
decision it made in individual cases considered to be wrong.  
According to the government proposals, the Hong Kong Commu-
nications Ordinance will not come into place before the establishment 
of the Communications Authority. Therefore adequate legal provisions 
must be put in place to regulate the functions, powers and duties of the 
59 s 12 Communications Act 2003.
60 s 12(5) of the Communications Act 2003 read “In appointing persons to be members of the 
Content Board, OFCOM must secure that, for each of the following parts of the United 
Kingdom, (a) England, (b) Scotland, (c) Wales, and (d) Northern Ireland, there is a different 
member of the Board capable of representing the interests and opinions of persons living in that 
part of the United Kingdom”.
61 Feintuck M. and Varney M., Media Regulation, Public Interest and the Law, 2006, p 186.
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CA. Moreover, the Bills of Rights Ordinance and common law remedies 
of judicial review will be applicable to provide adequate legal remedies 
for local citizens who feel aggrieved by any policies or decisions adopted 
by the CA.
In conclusion, the implementation experience of OFCOM has clearly 
demonstrated the merits of a unifi ed regulator for the communications sec-
tor. While Hong Kong need not necessarily adopt the UK model completely, 
the lessons drawn from the OFCOM experience should provide much useful 
reference if the government proceeds to establish the CA in the near future.
